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Challenging Neighbours:
Rethinking German and Dutch
economic institutions
Lans Bovenberg, George Gelauff, and
AndrJ de Jong *
growing international interdependency has increased the
importance of institutions as a major force in the process
of international competition for mobile factors of produc-
tion. This competition produces information about the
institutions that work and do not work. By comparing the
German and Dutch institutions, Challenging Neighbours
allows policymakers in both countries to exploit this
information, thereby learning from each other’s successes
and failures. Furthermore, it challenges them to address
major trends through innovative policies.
Why Germany?
From a Dutch point of view, Germany is an obvious choice
for a reference country because of the strong mutual links
between the German and Dutch economies. Moreover, the
main policy issues in both countries are quite similar,
although specific solutions and approaches often differ.
Furthermore, by delving deeper into the institutions in
the two countries, Challenging Neighbours scrutinizes the
quickly shifting perceptions about the strengths and
weaknesses of the German and Dutch economies. Until
quite recently, the German ‘social market economy’ was
generally praised as an economic model that combined
economic vigor with solidarity and social consensus. At the
present time, however, different words fill the air: structural
rigidities, resistance to change, political deadlocks, high
unemployment, and firms escaping high labor cost by in-
vesting abroad.
Whereas popular opinion on the social market economy
thus shifted away from a superior form of capitalism to-
wards an example of institutional rigidity, an opposite devel-
opment took place in the common wisdom about the Dutch
economy: ‘Dutch disease’ turned into the much envied
‘polder model’ or ‘delta model.’ In the 1970s and early 1980s,
the Netherlands showed how not to deal with stagflation:
an expanding welfare state financed by substantial natural
gas revenues and a higher tax burden, failing social agree-
ments between unions and employers’ organizations (the
social partners), surging unemployment and disability
benefits, and widening fiscal deficits. At present, in contrast,
many commentators praise the Dutch reforms in welfare
state arrangements, wage moderation produced by cooper-
ation between social partners, product market deregulation,
and discipline in public spending, which allows a reduced
fiscal deficit to be reconciled with a lower tax burden.
In arriving at a balanced view on the two economies, one
should keep in mind that unification strongly affected the
German economy in the 1990s. Unification would have
presented a major challenge to any economy. After a
comparable shock, many countries would have been in
worse shape than Germany is in at the moment.
How?
In exploring how institutions affect economic performance,
the study emphasizes that institutional design involves
trading off various objectives. The analytical framework
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In the beginning of September, CPB published ‘Challenging
Neighbours: Rethinking German and Dutch Economic
Institutions.’ Challenging Neighbours compares economic
institutions in Germany and the Netherlands against the
background of major social, demographic, technological,
and international trends. The study explores the strengths
and weaknesses of the Dutch ‘polder model’ or ‘delta
model’ and the German ‘social market economy.’ In assess-
ing these strengths and weaknesses, it frequently employs
the United States and the United Kingdom as benchmarks.
The analysis yields a number of policy options for both
Germany and the Netherlands. After describing the back-
ground and motivation of the study, this article summarizes
the most important policy conclusions of the study.
BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
Why focus on institutions?
Challenging Neighbours focuses on economic institutions,
such as formal and informal rules, regulations and legis-
lation. Examples are labor-market regulations, wage
bargaining, rules on corporate governance, market
regulation, etc. Compared to traditional fiscal and monetary
policy, institutions are becoming an increasingly important
determinant of economic performance. In particular,
Abstract
CPB recently finished a study exploring economic insti-
tutions in Germany and the Netherlands entitled ‘Chal-
lenging Neighbours: Rethinking German and Dutch Eco-
nomic Institutions.’ This article briefly describes the
background and analytical framework of the study. Sub-
sequently, it summarizes the main policy conclusions
provided by the study.
Samenvatting
Het CPB heeft recent een vergelijkende studie afgerond
naar de economische instituties in Duitsland en Neder-
land onder de titel ‘Challenging Neighbours: Rethinking
German and Dutch Economic Institutions.’ Dit artikel
beschrijft kort de achtergrond en het analytische kader
van de studie. Vervolgens worden de belangrijkste
beleidsopties die uit de studie voortvloeien samengevat.
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(see box, “The analytical framework: Coordination and
trade-offs” on next page) of the study starts from four ma-
jor market failures that require coordination (the so-called
coordination issues). Subsequently, it identifies four
mechanisms to coordinate decisions: competition, control,
cooperative exchange, and common values and norms.
An analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the
coordination mechanisms yields four fundamental trade-
offs: flexibility versus commitment, incentives versus
solidarity, diversity versus scale (or scope), and experi-
mentation versus certainty. The trade-offs indicate that
different institutional orders are feasible, each featuring
their own strengths and weaknesses. National institutions
determine which side of a trade-off features more promi-
nently in a specific country. Since a country’s position on
each trade-off affects economic performance, the trade-offs
link institutions to performance.
These links depend also on social, technological and
economic conditions affecting the environment in
which institutions operate. Trends changing the environ-
ment may shift these conditions and may thus require
institutional adjustment. Challenging Neighbours focuses
on demographic, social, technological and international
economic trends. Aging is a major demographic trend.
Important social trends include more heterogeneous soci-
eties, individualization and increased environmental
concern. The most relevant technological trends involve
the diffusion of information technology, which makes
technology more easily marketable, and the emergence
of the entrepreneurial firm in which learning and incre-
mental innovation are the crucial activities. Several
trends, including internationalization, liberalization,
deregulation, and the emergence of regions in Asia and
Eastern Europe, are reshaping the international economy.
POLICY OPTIONS
The socioeconomic order:
looking for new combinations
Trends call for new combinations of institutions at different
levels within the socioeconomic and political order. To il-
lustrate, social and technological trends demand decentrali-
zation in industrial relations. This enables differentiation
between sectors and companies to arrive at tailor-made
and flexible solutions meeting the trends towards heteroge-
neity, individualization and market-oriented technologies.
After a long period of deadlock and social turmoil in the
1970s and early 1980s, the severity of the crisis of the
welfare state forced the Netherlands to initiate a process
of institutional innovation in the 1980s. New combinations
in the Dutch socioeconomic order entailed a shift towards
more advisory relationships. In particular, agreements
between the social partners at the national level no longer
specify detailed outcomes, but identify common policy ob-
jectives, specify general guidelines and define boundary
conditions. This facilitates the commitment to common
goals. At the same time, the responsibilities of the govern-
ment and the social partners (at different levels) were clari-
fied and separated. Once a common goal, like the restorati-
on of profitability and employment, had been identified, this
facilitated a joint approach to address economic and social
challenges. At the sectoral or firm level, for example, em-
ployers and unions apply their specific policy instruments
to implement the general agreements.
To a certain degree, the German position after unifica-
tion resembles the Dutch position after stagflation in the
early 1980s. Both shocks required medium-term modera-
tion of real disposable incomes. However, socioeconomic
institutions in both countries failed to internalize the
positive external effects of wage moderation. Moreover,
expectations adjust slowly to new circumstances.
Accordingly, a vicious circle resulted of rising labor costs,
declining employment, rising tax burdens and widening
government budget deficits.
   In Germany, the strong political checks and balances
(i.e. the formal separation of government and the associa-
tions of labor and capital, the juridical foundation of
the socioeconomic order, interlocking federalist relation-
ships and the opposition majority in the Bundesrat) ham-
per attempts to establish support for reform. Indeed,
Germany faces the challenge to translate the strong checks




Coordination issues identify four main areas that
require coordination:
— market power results from economies of scale or
collusion,
— externalities are interdependencies outside the
price system,
— specificity concerns investment in relationship-
specific assets,
— risk sharing deals with fundamental uncertainty.
Coordination mechanisms define the type of
human interaction:
— competition entails rivalry between agents striving
for something that not all can obtain,
— control entails the power of an agent to take
decisions and impose these on others,
— common values and norms pertain to congruent
sets of preferences within a group of economic
agents,
— cooperative exchange involves bargained consul-
tation and cooperation between a limited number
of otherwise independent agents with different
preferences.
Coordination issue Relevant trade-off






risk sharing incentives versus solidarity
97/3
BPC_ R   E   P   O   R  T
45
Is the revitalized Dutch model of any help in creating a more
flexible socioeconomic order in Germany? Although the
Dutch model is often believed to fit only a relatively small
homogeneous society like the Netherlands, some of its
strong elements may be applied in Germany at the level of
individual Länder. Accordingly, less coordination would
occur at the national level but more bargained consultation
would take place at the regional level. This would not only
allow flexibility to accommodate diverse regional circum-
stances and to experiment at the regional level, but also
help to build commitment within Länder.
Social security and the labor market
Netherlands: better governance of social security
The Netherlands is introducing various checks and
balances in the governance structure of social insurance
in order to enhance the accountability of the social
insurance administration. In line with the situation in
Germany, the roles, objectives, and responsibilities of
the various players have been clarified. Also in social
assistance is the Netherlands moving in the direction of
the German system, by delegating more responsibility
to the decentralized level. To reap the benefits of this
reform, plans to increase the budget responsibility of
municipalities should proceed.
The relatively high Dutch replacement rates for social
disability continue to make the disability scheme vulnera-
ble to moral hazard. In stemming the inflow into disability
schemes, the Netherlands can benefit from the tight claim
assessment procedures in Germany, which are based on
control and strict regulations.
Netherlands: better conditions for apprenticeships
To encourage Dutch firms to invest more in portable
training, two main lessons from the German apprenticeship
system are relevant. First, co-financing of workers should
be increased, thereby boosting the returns of the firm on
apprenticeship training. Collective labor agreements may
have to provide more flexibility to adjust apprenticeship
wages to training costs and the situation in the labor mar-
ket. The other lesson from Germany is that the apprentice-
ship system should be diverse enough to be attractive for
a wide ability range.
Germany: more labor market flexibility
A well-functioning labor market with a high level of
employment is a prerequisite for generous social
insurance. Moreover, participation in the labor market
should be the preferred route for protecting people
against income loss. In this connection, wage moderation
yields a double dividend. First, it enhances employment --
the financial base of the welfare state. Second, it reduces
spending on social benefits by cutting both the value and
the number of benefits.
The German system of collective bargaining is not
conducive to wage moderation. In particular, sectoral
collective bargaining is less strongly influenced by
consensus building at a centralized level than it is in the
Netherlands. Rather, by giving leading sectors a large
autonomy in collective bargaining, it tends to induce
leapfrogging. In line with the suggestions with respect to
the socioeconomic order, part of the centralized coordina-
tion in Germany could occur at the regional rather than the
national level because the building of consensus and
commitment tends to be easier at a lower level. In order to
ensure that regional agents internalize the external effects
of their bargain on the unemployment level, the regional
level may have to assume a larger budget responsibility for
unemployment insurance.  Bargaining consultation at the
central -- regional -- level could provide general guidelines,
while delegating specific issues to a more decentralized
level to meet the need for more differentiation and
flexibility.
To improve overall employment, also a flexible labor
market can make an important contribution. A labor
market with low entry barriers to outsiders constitutes an
important insurance mechanism against the risk of income
loss. In this connection, more liberal regulations with
respect to the use of flexible contracts in Germany could
increase the access of unskilled workers to the labor
market. Moreover, flexible contracts may meet the more
heterogeneous needs of employers and workers.
Germany’s emphasis on control and regulations in social
security implies that Germany may need to employ fewer
financial incentives to stem moral hazard than the Nether-
lands does. Nevertheless, the market-oriented reforms in
disability and sickness insurance may provide a source of
inspiration for Germany. In particular, privatizing the sickness
scheme, as in the Netherlands, would imply that employers
bear the full cost burden of the effect of generous extra-
statutory provisions on the sickness rate. This would encour-
age employers to reduce these supplementary provisions.
Unfinished agenda for both countries
Technological and organizational developments increas-
ingly put at risk vulnerable individuals with few marketable
skills. Social benefits were originally intended to primarily
relieve liquidity constraints by carrying people over rela-
tively short unemployment spells. At the present time, how-
ever, structural unemployment and dependency require
more active policies with conditional and in-kind benefits
(e.g. training and other investments in human capital) to
avoid social exclusion and maintain human capital. Wage
subsidies or vouchers for the long-term unemployed can
be used as a particular form of in-kind benefits aimed at
stimulating demand for the low skilled. This demand may
be stimulated also by deregulating sheltered sectors. In-
deed, more flexible labor and commodity markets help to
increase the access of vulnerable groups to work.
A shift towards more active labor-market policies
involving conditional and in-kind benefits calls for tailor-
made solutions implemented by a decentralized benefit
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administration that exploits its information advantage
about individual circumstances. Accordingly, social secu-
rity administrations should be transformed from hierarchi-
cal bureaucratic organizations to more decentralized,
entrepreneurial and customer-oriented bodies with their
own budget responsibility. This requires the delegation
of decisionmaking and budget responsibility to more
decentralized levels.
Pensions
The rapid aging of the population over the next four de-
cades poses serious challenges to pension systems. At the
same time, various non-demographic trends (including fi-
nancial innovation, international integration, technological
change, individualization, and a more heterogeneous popu-
lation with diverse needs) call for pension reform.
Netherlands: lower aspiration levels
The Dutch pension system contributes to high marginal and
average tax wedges, thereby distorting labor supply.
Moving away from final-pay to average-pay occupational
schemes would narrow these wedges by tightening the
link between premiums and benefits. Increasing the
possibilities for firms to opt out of industry-wide pension
funds is consistent with the trend towards more heteroge-
neous preferences, which requires more diversity. More-
over, more opt-out possibilities would increase competitive
pressures on pension funds to improve their performance.
To address these trends and at the same time maintain
some intergenerational risksharing, firms could be required
to participate in industry-wide pension funds only for
pension benefits with lower aspiration levels.
Germany: smaller first pillar
The German welfare state is especially vulnerable to aging
because a large part of public transfers accrues to the
elderly. Germany may therefore want to gradually reduce
PAYG benefits collected by those earning higher incomes.
This would yield a better balanced portfolio between
funded and PAYG schemes, as workers with middle-
and higher incomes would substitute private (funded)
pensions for public PAYG benefits.
 The current system of book reserves for occupational
pensions discourages the development of modern finan-
cial markets and inhibits the efficient allocation of capital.
Moreover, it prevents pension saving from benefiting from
higher returns and more diversification. To address these
drawbacks of book reserves, the government should re-
move the tax obstacles against setting up independent pen-
sion funds.
Occupational pensions in Germany stress commitment
at the expense of flexibility. To address various trends that
demand more flexibility in the German labor market, the
vesting period for pension benefits could be shortened.
Furthermore, increased portability of pension rights would
facilitate labor mobility.
Unfinished agenda for both countries
The third, voluntary, pillar of pension insurance, which can
cater to individual preferences, is quite small in both
countries because the mandatory, collective level of pen-
sion insurance is high. As tastes have become more
heterogeneous and the mandatory aspiration levels have
increased in after-tax terms, many workers are likely
to have become overinsured. Diversity and personal
responsibility in pension insurance could be enhanced
by reducing high compulsory levels of collective pensions,
thereby leaving more room for individual provisions.
These latter provisions could insure individuals against not
only old-age risk but also other human capital risks, such
as unemployment and obsolescence of human capital.
The effective retirement age is quite low in both coun-
tries. To facilitate efficient decision making by workers with
diverse needs and preferences, pension systems should
confront potential retirees and their employers with the
social costs of retirement. In other words, early and delayed
retirement benefits should be more actuarially fair.
Various routes for withdrawing from the labor force are
substitutes. Thus, in confronting employers and workers
with the social costs of early retirement, governments
should pursue a comprehensive approach. Various conditio-
nal social security benefits, such as unemployment and dis-
ability benefits, are subject to moral hazard. As the work
force ages, these moral hazard problems become more
serious because older workers are subject to higher disabil-
ity and unemployment risk. These considerations increase
the need to reform social insurance along the lines outlined
above. Moreover, age-related pay schemes may have to be
reconsidered so that wages can be better adjusted to indi-
vidual productivity levels. Also this may require modifica-
tion of social security schemes. For example, occupational
pension systems and unemployment insurance schemes
that link benefits to final pay, discourage gradual retirement
through occupational downgrading with lower rates of pay.
Indexing the statutory retirement age to life expectancy
is the most natural way to insure society against a longer
average life of its citizens so that people spend part of their
longer life in work and part in retirement. A higher retire-
ment age implies that the human capital embodied in the
elderly is used more intensively, thereby raising the return
on human capital formation.
Corporate governance
Germany: replace the co-determined supervisory board
In the same way as German interlocking politics (Politik-
verflechtung) in intergovernmental relationships, inter-
locking checks and balances in corporate governance
limit  flexibility. The German supervisory board constitutes
the nexus of all checks and balances between the
different stakeholders in the company. This combination
of the interests of several stakeholders in a single institu-
tional body complicates decision making, tends to narrow
the discussion to rather general observations, and
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hampers exchange of information because of a fear of
loss of confidentiality. A stronger separation of responsi-
bilities among the various actors and institutional bodies,
such as the works council, may still provide the checks
and balances that are required to sustain commitment,
while at the same time enhancing incentives and
flexibility.
Two institutional adjustments seem desirable. First,
replacing the co-determined supervisory board and more
intensively using supervisory board subcommittees.
Second, restricting the voting power of banks, conform
current policy proposals, would help disentangle interlock-
ing checks and balances.
The Netherlands: leave co-option
To enhance the efficacy of Dutch corporate governance
in safeguarding the quality of both the management board
and the supervisory board, the influence of shareholders
on the supervisory board should increase. A lesson from
the German model is to leave co-option and to allow a
(substantial) majority of votes in the general meeting of
shareholders to replace the supervisory board. These
reforms would give the Dutch corporate governance
institutions a relatively strong central position on the
trade-off between commitment and flexibility; this system
would suffer neither from the inefficacy of a co-determined
board (as in Germany), nor from a short-term orientation
and frequent hostile takeover practices (as in the United
States).
Science and technology policy
Germany: more differentiation and flexibility
in higher education
Strengthening subsidiarity would promote differentiation
and flexibility in German higher education. Diminishing
national coordination may also increase experimentation
at the decentralized level to reduce the length of studies and
to curtail the high teaching load. Proper financial incentives
may support this experimentation by intensifying compe-
tition between Länder.
Netherlands: more flexibility of research centers
The German Max Planck Gesellschaft not only performs
high-quality basic research but also explores new scientific
areas. In thus combining quality and flexibility, it provides
an interesting case for current Dutch policy initiatives aimed
at concentrating basic research institutes in separate and
flexible organizations.
Germany applies rather strong financial incentives to
enhance flexibility of its Blue List institutes, which have to
compete with universities for funding. This policy appears
rather effective in promoting flexibility. Accordingly,
Germany may want to apply a similar policy to its large
research institutes, which at present run the risk of becom-
ing locked in technologies of the past. If the aim is to
enhance flexibility, also the Netherlands may want to raise
the share of peer review finance and contract finance in
total financing of its large research centers.
Regulation and competition policy
Developments in the Anglo-Saxon countries, the creation
of an internal European market, technological develop-
ments, and modern regulation theory have stimulated
reform of regulation and competition policy in both
countries. The new Dutch Competition Act is modelled af-
ter the corresponding German and European provisions.
Just as in Germany, the new Dutch competition authority
will be independent from the political authorities with the
primary aim to safeguard competition. The Netherlands
may also want to consider instituting a committee of
independent experts who regularly report on the state of
competition. This is in analogy of the German Monopolies
Commission.
Unfinished agenda for both countries
Independence is desirable not only for the competition
authority but also for regulators. Unlike the United Kingdom
and the United States, however, both Germany and the
Netherlands lack a complete network of independent
regulators. Following the examples of the Anglo-Saxon
countries, (future) regulators not only should be indepen-
dent from the ministries that are currently responsible for
regulation, but also should be placed under the competiti-
on authority. This allows knowledge and expertise to be
shared. Most importantly, it mitigates the risk of regulatory
capture.
As regards regulation policy, Germany and the Nether-
lands are currently in the process of implementing Euro-
pean Union directives aimed at liberalizing sectors
that used to have a natural monopoly nature. In telecom-
munications, for example, more network competition
and a less restrictive concessions policy will intensify
competition. Germany is lagging somewhat behind in
this respect, as German Telecom is one of the few monopo-
listic operators in Europe that controls the cable TV network.
With respect to the liberalization of postal services,
however, Germany is ahead of the Netherlands. In public
transport, competition is still practically nonexistent in both
countries and will require additional government actions.
Furthermore, at the more decentralized government levels,
privatization opportunities should be encouraged, for ex-
ample in waste management and public housing.
Electricity and gas markets
These energy sectors illustrate the importance of introdu-
cing competition as a way to enhance efficiency in sectors
that were previously considered natural monopolies requi-
ring heavy government intervention.
The electricity market: more checks and balances
Whether current reform proposals will actually be effective
in stimulating competition is subject to some doubts. To
48
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further strengthen competition, Germany may want to in-
troduce regulated third-party access, separate the grids,
and allow more contract freedom.
In addition to separating the grid, converting the four
existing regional generators into independent production
companies would be the most effective way to introduce
genuine competition on the Dutch the domestic market.
The exploitation of economies of scale and strengthening
the competitive position of Dutch generators on the Euro-
pean market might constitute arguments for merging the
relatively small Dutch generators into a single large-scale
production facility. To secure effective competition on the
domestic market, this latter option would require not only
separation of the grid but also independent ownership re-
lations and a powerful Supervisory Authority.
The natural gas market
Also in the gas market, there is a need to separate the natu-
ral monopoly from competitive activities and to establish
independent supervision. Leaving the grid in the hands of
parties that have interests also in the sale of gas runs the
risk of inhibiting genuine competition.
As a country without major natural gas resources,
Germany has a strong interest in strengthening free trade
and competition in the natural gas market in order to secure
reliable gas supply at low prices. Nevertheless, Germany
has taken only modest steps to liberalize the gas market.
Accordingly, additional steps, such as introducing regula-
ted instead of negotiated third party access and unbundling
of the networks, are called for. In view of the large size of
the German market, unilateral German steps may facilita-
te similar steps on a European level.
The Netherlands is one of the few European countries
with large natural gas reserves. In contrast to Germany,
therefore, the Netherlands faces a trade-off between
competition and the rents of natural gas, which largely flow
to the central government. Whereas the Dutch government
accepts lower rents as a result of the liberalization of the
internal gas market, it is not prepared to walk in front,
thereby losing even more (domestic) revenues for the sake
of (international) competition. Given this position, room for
further unilateral liberalization is very limited.
Health care
Health care systems in both countries are quite similar and
have moved in the same direction in recent years. The main
failure in the health care market that both countries have not
tackled so far is moral hazard by the provider of health care.
To alleviate this problem, the scope for introducing more
managed competition in health care should be explored.
Managed competition deals with information asymmetries,
adverse selection, and moral hazard by creating certain
institutions. One important element is to allow insurance
plans to exclude inefficient providers and select efficient
ones. This facilitates integration of the financing and
delivery of health care in so-called health plans. Another
element is to allow the (integrated) providers to compete
for customers. A final element is the creation of a sponsor.
The sponsor acts as the purchasing agent for a pre-selected
pool of customers. Moreover, it makes the market more
transparent by providing information about the health
plans and screening the risk features of the customers.
Collecting information on ex-ante risk allows the sponsor
to compensate the competing plans for differences in ex-
ante risks. Accordingly, as various health plan providers try
to gain a competitive advantage, they can focus on provid-
ing better health care rather than on risk selection.
Introducing more managed competition features some
drawbacks. In particular, it results in more diversity in ser-
vice levels, in other words inequality. In view of the strong
preferences for equal treatment in Germany and the
Netherlands, we suggest to start with a limited experiment,
also because managed competition entails sailing into
untested waters. In the Netherlands, such an experiment
could focus on private insurance.
CHALLENGING NEIGHBOURS:
A LEARNING PROCESS OF ITS OWN
The research for Challenging Neighbours started as an
exercise in applied institutional economics. An exciting
exercise, which proved to be more difficult and extensive
than anticipated at the beginning. A major strength of
this study is that it provides a strong theoretical frame-
work to understand the trade-offs that society faces in
institutional design. The framework helps also to explore
how future trends impact the positions of the trade-offs. The
qualitative analytical method complements quantitative
benchmarking studies, such as the recent competitiveness
reports by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs.
In accordance with the focus of the study on major
trade-offs in institutional design, policy conclusions should
be regarded primarily as food for thought rather than
precise policy prescriptions. Indeed, the complexity of the
issues precludes simple solutions.
Challenging Neighbours constitutes the background
report for a conference on Standort Germany and Standort
the Netherlands in Düsseldorf on September 10 and 11.
CPB looks forward to the opinion of researchers and policy
makers on the issues and highly welcomes feedback on the
contents of the book.
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